The President, CongTess, and the Courts recognized that if Burr could prove the relevancy of the material withheld and if the proceedings were a prosecution in chief [instead of commitment proceedings], he might discontinue the case. 0 Apparently Rhodes did not realize that this statement demolished his argument.
In the preliminary first stage proceedings, Burr sought to procure a letter of October 21, 180[6], written by General Wilkinson to Jefferson, by means of a subpoena calling both for Jefferson's attendance and production of the letter, 10 though Burr repeatedly stated that he was content merely to obtain the letter."' Alexander McRae, of counsel for Jefferson, "admitted that the President might be summoned to attend,"' 12 an admission to which Marshall later adverted,' 3 but George Hay, the United States Attorney, disputed issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. 14 Because Marshall fully appreciated the importance of the personal summons, he was not content to rest on the concession of counsel but rendered a written opinion on June 13, 1807, in which he concluded that "any person charged with a crime in the courts of the United States, has a right before, as well as after indictment, to the process of the Court, to compel the attendance of his witnesses."'"
Turning to the subpoena duces tecum Marshall stated: "In the provisions of the Constitution and of the statute which give to the accused a right to the compulsory process of the Court there is no exception whatever." Likening the President to the Governor of a State, he observed that "it is not known ever to have been doubted, that the Chief Magistrate of a State might be served with a subpoena ad testificandum." He added that "it has never been alledged [sic]"
The Yale Law Journal that in England "a subpoena might not be directed" to members of the "cabinet council," who, instead of the King, he correctly noted, were the analogue of the American executive. 16 Marshall could "perceive no legal objection to issuing a subpoena duces tecum, to any person whatever, provided the case be such as to justify the process."" If the papers "may be important in the evidence-if they may be safely read at the trial-would it not be a blot in the page which records the judicial proceedings of this country, that, in a case of such serious import as this, the accused should be denied the use of them? "' 8 Marshall then addressed the argument that "the letter contains matter which ought not to be disclosed;" he said, "There is certainly nothing before the Court, which shews, that the letter in question contains any matter, the disclosure of which, would endanger the public safety. If it does contain any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the Executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will of course, be suppressed." 19 As further developments indicate, Marshall was not to waver from this view. Should Burr be found guilty, he added, all concerned "should certainly regret that a paper which the accused believed to be essential to his defence ... had been withheld from him;" and "it would justly tarnish the reputation of the Court which had given its sanction to its being withheld." Sounding a personal note, Marshall went on to say that he would feel "selfreproach" were he to "declare on the information now possessed, that the accused is not entitled to the letter in question, if it should be really important to him. '20 In sum, Marshall made the touchstone of nondisclosure danger to the public safety, not "confidentiality," as President Nixon urges; and even such matter would be sheltered only if it were not "essentially applicable" to the defense. He regarded a judicial sanction to withhold such "essential" information as a "blot" which would "tarnish the reputation of the Court."
Corwin's statement that Jefferson "refuse[d] to respond to Chief the selection of such parts, as it might deem necessary to the defence of the accused?" Luther Martin objected to a "secret tribunal," whereupon Hay proposed to "submit those letters to the inspection of either Mr. Randolph counsel insisted that Burr too should see the letter and demanded production in "public. ' 2 9 This is worlds apart from the Nixon claim 21 . Ford, supra note 12, at 55-56. 22 ROBERTSON , supra note 24, at 502, and that Hay said, "I wish the court to look at the letter and say whether it does not contain what ought not to be submitted to public inspection." Id. at 509. It "cannot be right," said Hay, that Burr "shall have . . . access to the letter, merely for the purpose of making it public." 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 25. In his opinion of September 4, Marshall took account of this dispute; he said, The Yale Law Journal of blanket "confidentiality," of a right to withhold from court as well as counsel. Instead, Hay left the final determination to the court.
What were the "strictures" Jefferson's counsel were so zealous to shield? Rhodes, who apparently consulted true copies of the letter in the archives, states that Wilkinson referred to the "complicity of Governor Claiborne of Louisiana and his secretary, Cowles Meade, in the [Burr] conspiracy. Claiborne was a trusted appointee of Jefferson, who was adamant that the charges against Claiborne and his aide not be made public." 30 Since Wilkinson was to testify against Burr, this attempted suppression is not the most glorious chapter in Jefferson's history. A subpoena issued on September 4 and Hay promptly made a return with a copy of the letter;
excepting such parts thereof as are, in my opinion, not material for the purposes of justice, for the defence of the accused, or pertinent to the issue.... The accuracy of this opinion, I am willing to refer to the judgment of the Court, by submitting the original letter for its inspection. 31 Earlier, on June 12, Jefferson had devolved on Hay "the exercise of that discretion, which it would be my right and duty to exercise by withholding ... any parts of the letter, which are not directly material for the purposes of justice." 3 2 Neither Jefferson nor Hay invoked an absolute claim of right to withhold information from the court. They restricted themselves to matters irrelevant to the cause and Hay was willing to leave the judgment on relevancy to the Court. 33 Burr's counsel, Botts, then moved that the "prosecution should stand, and be continued until that letter shall be in the possession of your Clerk.
' ' 34 On this state of facts Marshall delivered a second opinion on September 4. Rhodes asserts that rather than review "the withheld data in camera or otherwise and weighing relevant interests," Marshall With respect to the secrecy of these parts which it is stated are improper to give out to the world, the Court will take any order that may be necessary. I do not think that the accused ought to be prohibited from seeing the letter: but I will order that no copy of it be taken for public exhibition; and that no use shall be made of it but what is necessarily attached to the case . . . . [I]f it is necessary to debate it in public, those who take notes may be instructed not to insert any part of the arguments on that subject. Id. at 38. 30 . Rhodes, supra note 4, at 52, 53. 31 . 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 27-28. 32 . 1 id. at 10 (second series of pagination). 33. Throughout, "relevancy" was the touchstone. See pp. 1114, 1118 supra, text accompanying notes 32-33, pp. 1120-21 infra, and note 37 infra.
34. 3 T. CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 30.
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The President, Congress, and the Courts "repeatedly sidestepped or ignored suggestions by one or the other of the parties to examine the letter and determine the validity of the president's assertion." 5 Rhodes bases his argument on Marshall's statement, "I never ought to have heard it at all, and which I must treat as though I have never heard. I cannot, therefor, speak from any knowledge I have of the letter." 3 6 The reason for this statement, which escaped Rhodes, was in Marshall's own words that "it is impossible that either the Court or the attorney [for the President] can know in what manner it is meant to be used: I must, therefore, consider declaration made upon that subject, as though they had not been made." '37 In other words Marshall sought to determine a broad issue of law, divorced from his premature and incomplete knowledge of the facts, which he broadly hinted did not really demand nondisclosure. 3 8 Marshall emphasized that only the defendant knew what was essential to his case and refused to take from him the right of making that decision.
Marshall phrased the issue in broadest terms: "If then the executive possesses a paper which is really believed by the accused to be material to his defence, ought it to be withheld?" 3 9
That the President... might be subpoenaed and examined as a witness, and called upon to produce any paper which is in his possession, is not controverted, indeed that has once been decided. ... I can very readily conceive, that the President might receive a letter which it would be very improper to require for public exhibition, because of the manifest inconvenience of the exposure. There ought, in such a case, to be an extremely strong occasion for its demand 40 reasons which induced the President to refuse the paper as a governing principle to induce them to refuse its exhibition, except as it shall be made to appear absolutely necessary in the defence. 42 Burr had filed an affidavit that the letter "may be material" to his defense and Marshall held that since "no sufficient reason is adduced, except in the affidavit of the accused ... the Court must suppose that the paper ought to be produced; and if that is refused, the Court must take the proper means of ordering the continuance of the case until it is produced. ' 43 He concluded that "I do not think that the accused ought to be prohibited from seeing the letter." 4 4 Thus, although Marshall attached great weight to presidential representations that a document should be withheld, he reaffirmed what he had earlier held: that the needs of the accused were primary.
For the purpose of weighing presidential claims against those needs, Marshall had said in his September 4 opinion that the President himself, not his delegate, must "judge as to his motives for withholding the letter." 4 5 To meet this requirement, Hay had sent an express letter to Jefferson at Monticello on September 5, and on September 9 he read into the record a certificate from Jefferson (to which was annexed a copy of the Wilkinson November 12 letter) in which Jefferson recited that he had deleted passages "in no wise material to the purposes of justice, on the charges of treason or misdemeanor .. .. [T]hey are on subjects irrelevant to any issue which can arise out of those charges, and could contribute nothing towards his acquittal or conviction." 46 That is all that the reports of the trial contain on the subject. 47 Nothing appears in Carpenter's report to indicate what was 42 . Id . at 36-37. The challenge to the sufficiency of Burr's allegation that the letter "may be material" was thus met by Marshall:
[I]f a paper be in the possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicancy can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not knowing its contents? . . . It has always been thought sufficient to describe the paper, and identify its general nature and authenticity . received, I cannot direct the production of those parts of the letter, without a sufficient evidence of their being relevant to the present prosecution.5s
The implication that if the deleted portions were shown to be "relevant" their production would be "directed" repels the inference that Marshall had earlier "accepted" the deletions.
After further argument Marshall "determined that the correct course, was to leave the accused all the advantages which he might derive from the parts actually produced; and to allow him all the advantages of supposing that the omitted parts related to any particular point. The accused may avail himself as much of them, as It is certainly fair to supply the omitted parts by suppositions . . . . If this were a trial in chief, I should perhaps think myself bound to continue the cause, on account of the withholding the parts of this paper; and I certainly cannot exclude the inferences which gentlemen may draw from the omissions. 00 This was the last word spoken by Marshall on the subject; it reaffirmed the earlier opinions that the needs of the accused would override presidential reasons for withholding. In this less formal commitment proceeding, Marshall permitted Burr to fill the place of the deleted parts by suppositions that would be given the force of evidence.
As Rhodes summarized:
The chief justice placed considerable emphasis on the president's assertion of irrelevancy of the parts withheld, stating that in order to make further demand for the letter Burr must give "sufficient evidence" of relevancy. He recognized that if Burr could prove the relevancy of the material withheld and if the proceedings were a prosecution in chief, he might discontinue the case, but in the absence of that proof and circumstances he refused further steps than allowing Burr to make the most favorable inference of the omitted part. 61 That allowance made the letter superfluous. needs of the accused. Before applying these rules to the facts, he required a personal claim of privilege by Jefferson. This was not the only time that Marshall delineated the applicable legal principles for the future guidance of counsel. In an opinion rendered on September 14 respecting the admissibility of certain testimony, Marshall laid down the governing rules and added, "Gentlemen well know how to apply these principles. Should any difficulty occur in applying them, the particular cases will be brought before the Court and decided." '6 4 The fact that Marshall had no occasion at the fourth stage commitment hearing to apply the law to the facts, because Burr could be richly content to substitute his "suppositions" for the deleted letter, does not render the opinions of June 13 and September 4 any less the law of the case. 65 The heart of Marshall's opinions was therefore justly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the "tapes" case: "The court was to show respect for the President's reason . . . but the ultimate decision remained with the Court." 00 1 If the courts are the "ultimate interpreters" of the Constitution and can therefore constrain Congress to operate within constitutional bounds, 67 they are no less empowered to measure presidential claims of constitutional power. The "mystique" of the President stops at the courthouse doors. 64 Let us begin with the words themselves; "nevertheless" is defined as "notwithstanding or in spite of." Consequently § 3 must be understood to mean that an indictment may be filed "in spite of" a prior removal or impeachment. It does violence to language to twist this into a requirement that an impeachment must precede indictment. The implication of "shall nevertheless be liable" to indictment is that the given party is already liable, that the words are merely designed to preserve existing criminal liability rather than to qualify it.09 It would be unreasonable to attribute to the Framers an intention to insulate officers from criminal liability by mere appointment to office; like all men they are responsible under the law. 7 0 Thus Solicitor General Robert H. Bork concluded in a brief designed to demonstrate that Vice President Spiro Agnew could be indicted before he was impeached: "[A] civil officer could be both impeached and criminally punished even absent the Article I, Section 3 proviso."
7 ' 1 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. It is reported that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski ad%ised the grand jury not to indict President Nixon: "It was researched at the time and the conclusion was that legal doubt on the question was so substantial that a move to indict a sitting President would touch off a legal battle of gigantic proportions." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1974 , at 24, col.
1.
When I first studied Article I, § 3, I was engrossed in the separation of the removal on impeachment from the indictment and unwittingly wrote that "[r]emoval would enable the government to replace an unfit person with a proper person, leaving 'punishmient' to a later and separate proceeding . The Yale Law Journal Since Article II, § 4, provides without discrimination for the im.
peachment of the "President, Vice President and all civil officers," Mr. Bork's statement should be equally applicable to the President. Furthermore, after impeachment and removal the President is returned to the body of the citizenry.7 2 No special dispensation is required to allow prosecution of a citizen; nor is there a scrap of evidence that the Framers were minded to clothe an ex-President in any immunity whatsoever. On the contrary, immunity was denied to him as President. It follows that the President is criminally triable while in office, because no special provision is required for trial of an ex-President. An interpretation of the saving clause that makes the President triable only after removal from office would therefore reduce the clause to "mere surplusage," ' 73 unless we adopt an alternative-that it was designed solely to foreclose the argument of double jeopardy.
Solicitor General Bork justly concluded, as did Justice Story 140 years ago, 74 that the "sole purpose" of the Article I, § 3 "indictment" proviso "is to preclude the argument that the doctrine of double jeopardy saves the offender from the second trial." ' 5 That danger arose from the English practice, wherein criminal punishment and removal were wedded in one proceeding; hence it was the part of caution to ward off an inference that a prior impeachment would constitute a bar to indictment. With Solicitor General Bork, I would conclude that the "nevertheless . . . subject to indictment" clause was not designed "to establish the sequence of the two processes, but solely to establish [that a prior conviction upon impeachment] does not raise a double jeopardy defense in a criminal trial." 76 So viewed, the "nevertheless" clause seeks to preserve the right 72 . As Chief Justice Marshall stated, he "is elected from the mass of the people" and "returns to the mass of the people." 1 D. ROBERTSON Mr . Bork properly points out that "impeachment and the criminal process serve different ends so that the outcome of one has no legal effect upon the outcome of the other," a conclusion justly rested on James Wilson: Impeachments . . . come not . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence.
They are founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims, and are directed to different objects; for this reason, the trial and punishment of an offense in the impeachment, is no bar to a trial of the same offense at common Bork, at 11, also cites cases in state courts that reached a similar conclusion under constitutional provisions modeled on Article 1, § 3, such as Commonwealth v. Rowe, Vol. 83: 1111 Vol. 83: , 1974 The President, Congress, and the Courts to a subsequent criminal prosecution, not to prescribe that it must be preceded by impeachment. Justice Miller's statement in Langford v. United States that "the ministers personally, like our President, may be impeached; or if the wrong amounts to a crime, they may be indicted" 7 7 likewise rebuts insistence that indictment must follow after impeachment.
This conclusion is further buttressed by other factors. "The only explicit immunity in the Constitution," said Solicitor General Bork, "is the limited immunity granted Congressmen" 7 in Article I, § 6, which provides:
The Senators and Representatives . . .shall in all cases, except treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.
In the words of Mr. Bork: Since the Framers knew how to, and did, spell out immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity exists where none is mentioned. 70 The Supreme Court has employed that principle of construction. 0 Not only is this the "natural inference," but we have the testimony of Charles Pinckney, one of the most active participants in the Constitutional Convention, who, in explaining the Constitution to the South Carolina Ratification Convention, stated that no immunity for the President was intended. Speaking in the Senate in 1800, Pinckney said that "it never was intended to give Congress . . .any but spec- James Wilson, considered by Washington "to be one of the strongest men in the Convention," 3 assured the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention that "not a single privilege is annexed to his [the President's] character." 8 4 Remarks such as these were a response to the pervasive distrust of executive power. 8 5 Nothing in the prior English practice, with which the Framers were familiar, 0 suggests a requirement that impeachment had to precede indictment. On several occasions the Parliament preferred to refer the case to the courts; and one of the most learned lawyers in Parliament, Sir John Maynard, said of the charges against Sir Adam Blair: "I would not go before the Lords, when the law is clear, and may be tried by juries."
Constitutional history therefore confirms the inference properly drawn from the face of the Constitution that no immunity was given to the President.
By a feat of legerdemain Mr. Bork would read the President out of this history. He recognizes that the impeachment debate "related almost exclusively to the Presidency" and that "the impeachment clause was expanded to cover the Vice President and other civil officers only toward the very end of the Convention." ' s Mr. The President, Congress, and the Courts Bork's view presents the anomaly that the history of the impeachment provision, framed entirely in the context of the President, refers only to the "Vice President and all civil officers," who were virtually unmentioned and were added as a last-minute afterthought. Thus a provision the "sole purpose" of which was to forfend the double jeopardy argument, which was not designed "to establish the sequence" of impeachment or indictment, and which is accompanied by an "immunity" provision limited to Congress (without immunity for felonies) so that "the natural inference is that no immunity exists where none is intended," suddenly is found to establish precisely that "sequence" and to confer exactly that un-"natural" immunity on The Yale Law Journal They employed neither "after" nor "afterwards" ;94 and it is not for us to supply a word thus omitted, to convert "nevertheless" (in spite of) into "afterward," that is, to transform a nonsequential provision into a prescribed sequence. Nor can the mistaken MorrisHamilton versions of the provision be read to create the very immunity that the Framers intentionally withheld from the President when they squarely faced the issue. The § 3 proviso must be read together with the immunity provision; if possible both should be given effect. 9 Above all, we "cannot rightly prefer" a meaning "which will defeat rather than effectuate the Constitutional purpose." 0 6
If, however, the remarks of Morris and Hamilton are to override this withholding of immunity, they no less demand that the "Vice President and all civil officers" likewise first be impeached and then indicted. Mr. Bork's anticipatory answer was that "[i]t is, of course, significant that such remarks referred only to the President, not to the Vice President and other civil officers." 0' 7 How could it be otherwise when the President was the sole object of discussion? There was no allusion to impeachment of the others until the end when the "Vice President and all civil officers" were casually added to the impeachment provision without discussion. 98 As Bork himself has stated, "[N]one of the general debates addressed or considered the particular nature of the powers [or immunities] of the Vice President or other civil officers." 99 How then could the Framers consider the denial to them of an immunity allegedly granted to the President? The fact is that all the history cited by Mr. Bork to establish the prior indictability of the Vice President had reference to the President alone and establishes his prior indictability.
After his bow to history, Mr. Bork turns to the structure of the Constitution, wherein he finds "embedded" reasons for drawing the distinction between the President and the others.' 0 0 No such distinction was, of course, drawn by the Founders; it is the product 94 The felt necessity for a curb on presidential transgressions, however, overcame this "independence" argument; despite the "crucial nature" of his powers, the Framers gave Congress power to oust him for various noncriminal offenses. 0 3 They made no move to interfere with the normal criminal process that applied to every person; on the contrary, they withheld from him an immunity from criminal prosecution that, but for felonies, they expressly conferred upon Congress. "This limited grant of immunity" to Congress, Bork explains, "demonstrates a recognition that, although the functions of the legislature are not lightly to be interfered with, the public interest in the expeditious and even-handed administration of the criminal law outweighs the cost imposed by the incapacity of a single legislator. Such incapacity does not seriously impair the functioning of Congress."104 A very different conclusion needs to be drawn from the fact that "a limited grant of immunity" was conferred upon members of Congress, whereas none whatever was given to the President: The President was not nearly as "important" in the eyes of the Framers as he is in those of Bork. "There is little doubt," said the Supreme Court, "that the instigation of criminal charges against the critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial forum ['the judges were often lackeys of the Stuart monarchs" 0 5 ] was the chief fear prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privi- 101 . Id The Yale Law Journal lege in England."' 10 6 Both the "speech and debate" clause and the "immunity from arrest" clause were "consciously" drawn by the Framers "from this common historical background,"' 0 7 which bespeaks fear of rather than special solicitude for executive power. Moreover, the Founders had observed that the most powerful ministers could be condemned to death without endangering the continuity of government, indeed, in the case of the Earl of Strafford, conducing to the preservation of liberty."' It is no answer to point to the invulnerability of the King because first, as Gouverneur Morris pointed out, "[the first Magistrate] is not the King but the primeMinister,"' 0 9 and second, as James Iredell emphasized, the President, unlike the King, was made triable." 0 A kindred speculation is that "[t]he Framers could not have contemplated prosecution of an incumbent President because they vested in him complete power over execution of the laws, which includes, of course, the power to control prosecutions.""' When President Nixon acted on this premise and discharged Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was engaged, among other things, in investigating whether the President was implicated in the Watergate coverup and other criminal acts, a storm of outrage swept over the White House." 2 It is reasonable to infer that the Framers never intended to permit the President to shield himself from criminal indictment by the control given him over such prosecutions. Next Mr. Bork argues that the presidential pardoning power extends to a pardon for himself, thus rendering criminal conviction ineffectual."1 3 Such a pardon after conviction would be an even greater affront to the nation than Nixon's discharge of Cox to impede his own prosecution. The "pardon" provision must be read in harmony with the "immunity" provision; it was not designed to confer an immunity intentionally withheld." 4 Constitutional construction should not depart from com- 87, 121 (1925) , the Court said that the pardoning power "is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it." An abuse "would suggest a resort to impeachment .... " Vol. 83: 1111, 1974 The President, Congress, and the Courts mon sense; 11 5 it should not proceed from horribles that the nation would reject and that would have even more greatly affronted the Founders.
Like Solicitor General Bork, Professor Alexander Bickel declares that the Article I, § 3 provision "does not remotely say that impeachment must precede indictment" and like him he considers that the "case of the President . . . is unique." He does not base this on the "original intention" but on the premise that "[i]n the presidency is embodied the continuity and indestructibility of the state." 11 6 He would thereby import into our system the monarchical notion that the continuity of the state was embodied in the crown:
"L'Etat c'est Moi. 1 " 7 But by the eighteenth century, Parliament had prevailed in its struggle with the King; and the downfalls of Charles I and James II had shown that the indestructibility of a King was not synonymous with the "indestructibility of the state." For Blackstone the "sovereign power" meant "the making of the laws"; it had come to rest in Parliament, "this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.""1 8 Therefore, if we are to look to the history the Founders had before them, the Parliament rather than the King was the repository of sovereignty, the symbol of "continuity." Among the revolutionary changes made by the Founders was to establish that sovereignty resided in the people and that the officers of government were merely their servants and agents. The Yale Law Journal expendable rather than indispensable; thus the view of the President taken by the Framers is incompatible with the proposition that in him the Framers "embodied the continuity and indestructibility of the state." The fact that they made him removable from office alone suggests that a hiatus in his office was not thought to threaten that "indestructibility." This also emerges from Hamilton's statement about the King: There is "no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution,"' 1 2 2 implying thereby that removal or indictment of the President coald have no calamitous effect. The nation has also survived a number of presidential deaths and assassinations without impairment of the presidency or the "indestructibility of the state." It is a mistake, I suggest, to identify the "continuity;' of the presidency with that of a given President. Whatever befalls a President, the state and the presidency are "indestructible."' 23 The fact is that a Vice President is immediately available to assume executive functions without skipping a beat; and if he is unavailable there is a row of statutory successors That is not a bad list to pit against the unfortunate succession of Andrew Johnson to the chair of Abraham Lincoln. A senseless assassination creates a shock for which the nation is utterly unprepared, in contrast to a removal on impeachment or conviction on indictment of a President in whom the nation has lost confidence.
Obviously, Professor Bickel states, "the presidency cannot be conducted from jail, nor can it be effectively carried on while an incumbent is defending himself in a criminal trial."' 24 The second 122 . THE FEDERALIsT No. 69, supra note 85. at 446. 123. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: "The Presidency, though its wings could be clipped for a time, was an exceedingly tough institution. . . . It had endured many challenges and survived many vicissitudes. It was nonsense to suppose that its fate as an institution was bound up with the fate of the particular man who happened to be President at any given time." A. SCHLESINGER There is a last practical consideration, which Solicitor General Bork summarized in the context of "civil officers":
[I]f Article I, Section 3, clause 7, were read to mean that no one not convicted upon impeachment could be tried criminally, the failure of the House to vote an impeachment, or the failure of the impeachment in the Senate, would confer upon the civil officer accused complete and-were the statute of limitations permitted to run-permanent immunity from criminal prosecution however plain his guilt. 28 That would be no less true of the President. No great stretch of the imagination is required to conceive that partisanship in Congress may defeat an impeachment of the President in the House or conviction by two-thirds of the Senate. Suppose that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski were convinced that he had evidence that would establish the President's guilt. Although a partisan one-third of the 125 . The Framers rejected suspension prior to conviction. See note 94 supra. 126 . Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned after indictment and before trial, explaining in part that the welfare of the nation would thereby be served. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973 , at 35. col. 3.
2 T. MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 128 (1890).
128. Bork, supra note 71, at 9-10.
The Yale Law Journal
Senate might differ, can it be reasonable that he should be barred from prosecution because an impeachment fell prey to partisanship? A mistake against which we must be ever vigilant is to read our own predilections back into the minds of the Framers. 12 0 One of the most eminent of the Founders, James Iredell, later a Justice of the Supreme Court, cautioned:
We are too apt, in estimating a law passed at a remote period, to combine, in our consideration, all the subsequent events which have had an influence upon it, instead of confining ourselves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances at the time of its passing. 130 These are not merely the yearnings of a legalistic "strict constructionist"; they are a canon of historiography. The task of the historian, Ranke taught, is to establish the facts of history wie es eigentlich gewesen war; the search must be for what actually happened and, if we find it, not to substitute for it what should have happened.
As in the task of construing any document, the primary function is to ascertain the intention of the draftsmen. When that intention is discovered, what Iredell said becomes of prime importance: "The people have chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed, or promised to submit upon any other." ''3 It is easier, however, to preach such vigilance than to practice it, as I can testify from personal experience in the very context of the distinction here under discussion. Influenced by the difficulty of giving the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" a narrow construction in the case of the President and a broad one for judges, I initially concluded that they must be given a single meaning. But I was led to alter my view upon consideration of the fact that judges were added to the impeachment provision at the last minute with no reference either to judges or to governing standards. From this and other data I reasoned that stricter standards of conduct might be required of a judge, that is, that the range of impeachable offenses might be broader. .,134 Here the presumption is fortified by the fact that the words are used not in different parts of the Constitution but in one place, in the very same context; and Mr. Bork seeks to give them a different meaning with respect to whom they apply. No trace of an intention to give them that dual meaning is to be found in the history of the provision. This is not to say that the presumption is irrebuttable, 135 but that the rebuttal cannot rest on factors that were not before the Framers, on an image of the presidency which is a product of our times and which they emphatically did not share.
Such distinctions represent but another attempt to revise the Constitution under the guise of euphemisms, derived from an exalted notion of the presidency which is far removed from the egalitarian 133 . Id. at 93.
286 US. 427, 433 (1932).

The Court stated,
Where the subject matter [impeachment] to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in another, the meaning may well vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration of the language in which those purposes are expressed, and of the circumstances under which the language was employed.
Id.
The Yale Law Journal sentiments of the Founders. 13 we are on the road that has unfailingly led to Caesarism. It was because the Founders had learned this lesson from history that presidential powers were enumerated and limited, and that immunity from arrest was altogether withheld. 156 When a client proclaims that he will "fight like hell" to balk impeachment it may be expected that his lawyer will follow suit. Not surprisingly, therefore, James St. Clair, chief defense counsel for President Nixon, has favored the House Judiciary Committee with a lengthy memorandum that purports to prove by recourse to history that the President may only be impeached for an indictable crime.
14 1
That standard would virtually nullify impeachment for the nonindictable offenses which were the chief concern of the Founders and which the evidence plainly shows they considered impeachable. Despite its issuance from the august precincts of the White House, the memorandum is but "lawyer's history," a pastiche of selected snippets and half-truths, exhibiting a resolute disregard of adverse facts, and simply designed to serve the best interests of a client rather than faithfully to represent history as it actually was.
Although defense lawyers are notoriously not the best source of constitutional history, 142 such pseudo-history cannot be ignored because, as J. R. Wiggins The Yale Law Journal summary that has placed 170 years of history squarely behind the assertion of unlimited executive power to withhold information threatens to get incorporated into that collection of fixed beliefs and settled opinions that governs the conduct of affairs. History thereafter may become what lawyers mistakenly said it was therefore."' 143 "Legal history," said Justice Frankfurter, "still has its claims."'
44
In the present controversial atmosphere it is all too easy to say "a plague on both your houses" and evenhandedly to attribute partisan readings of history to one and all. My study, however, of the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the central issue of impeachment, was undertaken in 1968-1970, submitted to the Southern California Law Review in mid-summer of 1970, and published in 1971,145 long before Watergate surfaced and before there was any thought that President Nixon might be impeachable. Composed in the quiet of a university, uninfluenced by fees or hopes of preferment, my study may or may not be mistaken, but it can hardly be dismissed as biased, simply because there then was no occasion whatsoever for partisan bias.
A. Indictable Offenses
Let us begin in midstream with the Nixon-St. Clair thesis that impeachment is available only for an indictable crime. Former Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson recently stated, "It seems clear to me as a matter of common sense that impeachable offenses cannot be limited to matters defined in the U.S. Penal Code."' 146 Common sense is buttressed by the historical record. Mr. St. Clair, quoting the Supreme Court, recognizes that under federal law there are no crimes except as declared by statute: "The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it .... ,, 147 That is what the Act of 1790 did for treason and bribery;' 148 but Vol. 83: 1111, 1974 The President, Congress, and the Courts with the exception of a handful of statutes, such as those that make "high misdemeanors" of privateering against friendly nations, 14 9 launching military expeditions against them from American soil,150 practicing law by a federal judge, .
1 1 conspiring or counseling to insurrection or riot,' 1 " there are no indictable "high misdemeanors." Consequently, the offenses the Founders particularly had in mind would be unimpeachable. Consider "subversion of the Constitution" -usurpation of power, the very offense that prompted the addition of the words "high crimes and misdemeanors." George Mason said in the Federal Convention:
Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. . . . It is the more necessary to extend the power of impeachments.' Under Mr. St. Clair's interpretation the manifest intention of the Framers to reach such subversion would be frustrated by the lack of an indictable crime, for no federal statute has made it a crime. So too, other categories of "high crimes and misdemeanors," under the English practice upon which our impeachment provisions were modeled and which were mentioned by the Founders, such as "abuse of power," "betrayal of trust," and "neglect of duty," would also fall by the wayside. Yet Madison stated that protection against presidential "negligence" was indispensable, that perversion of the office "into a scheme of . . . oppressi'on," that is, "abuse of power," duct." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Had Congress elected not to "affix a punishment," treason would not have constituted a "crime"; no one could have been prosecuted for treason. By the Act of 1790, treason was made a crime; it will hardly be maintained that prior thereto treasonable acts were indictable. An unpunishable "crime" is like "a grin without a cat."
Since, as Fordham recognized, "the definition appears to be intended for all purposes, including impeachment," 47 S. CAL. L. REV. at 676, it cannot be assumed that impeachment for treason was criminal in nature. The fact that George Mason emphasized that "treason" as defined would not reach "subversion of the Constitution" and suggested "maladministration" which, to say the least, comprehended some acts of noncriminal nature, alone argues against such an assumption. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 550, cited in R. BERGER, supra note 68, at 86. The substitution of "high crimes and misdemeanors" for Mason's "maladministration" indicates that the association of "high crimes and misdemeanors" with "treason" was not thought to render "high crimes and misdemeanors" criminal for impeachment purposes. Madison, the leading architect of the Constitution, furnished three illustrations of impeachable offenses that have never been made indictable crimes: (1) In the Virginia Ratification Convention he stated that "if the President be connected, in any suspicious manner with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter him," he may be impeached.' 57 (2) In the First Congressthat "almost adjourned session of the Convention"-he said that the President would be impeachable if he "neglects to superintend [his subordinates'] conduct, so as to check their excesses."' 15 (3) There too he stated that "the wanton removal of meritorious officers" would be impeachable.' x 9 To this day all of these categories of "high crimes and misdemeanors" have not been made indictable crimes, reflecting a continuing judgment by Congress, which has the "sole" jurisdiction of impeachment, that indictable crimes are not a prerequisite to impeachment, as four convictions by the Senate for nonindictable offenses confirm. 60 One hundred and forty years ago Justice Story pointed out that only treason and bribery were made indictable offenses by statute and that insistence on indictable crimes would enable impeachable offenders to escape scot-free and render the impeachment provisions "a complete nullity."''
The absurdity of Mr. St. Clair's analysis is pointed up by his incongruous juxtaposition of the 1790 treason and bribery statutes. "Any person" could be indicted under the "treason" Act whereas the "bribery" Act was specifically directed against judges who had accepted bribes .' 62 Even today it is open to question whether the bribery statute embraces the President. 0 3 Ju-dicial bribery was not mentioned in the Convention, but Gouverneur Morris emphasized that the President "may be bribed," and he instanced that "Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV"104 and that therefore the President ought to be impeachable. Notwithstanding that the President was the only mentioned object of constitutional impeachment for "bribery," he would be unimpeachable on Mr. St. Clair's reasoning because the penal "bribery" statute was confined to judges. Nor can we take seriously Mr. St. Clair's argument that "high crimes and misdemeanors" must involve criminal "offenses of such a serious nature [as] to be akin to treason and bribery."' 1 0 Treason and bribery are rank unequals. Treason is the arch offense -betrayal of the state to the enemy-whereas acceptance of so much as 550 as a bribe for favorable official action suffices to constitute bribery. Who would maintain that acceptance of such a petty bribe is more heinous than presidential usurpation or abuse of power? It remains to add two Founders' statements that repel the equation of an impeachable offense with an indictable crime. After adverting to impeachment in the North Carolina Ratification Convention, James Iredell stated that "the person convicted is further liable to a trial at common law, and may receive such common-law [ Another example of selective history in this same focus is his citation of the Article III, § 3(3) provision that "trial of all crimes except .. . impeachment shall be by jury" in order to demonstrate that impeachment was limited to "criminal matters."' ' 78 He ignores the fact, which I had also pointed out, that, with this exception before them, the draftsmen of the Sixth Amendment omitted it and extended trial by jury to "all criminal proceedings." Presumably they felt no need to exempt impeachment from the Sixth Amendment because they did not consider it a criminal prosecution. If impeachment be indeed criminal in nature, as Mr. St The Yale Law Journal fact that the criteria of what were impeachable crimes in England were employed by the Framers to identify causes for removal from office does not serve to make removal criminal, as a familiar example will make clear. Suppose that Jones runs a red light at 80 miles an hour and crashes into Smith, severely injuring Smith and destroying his car. Such reckless driving constitutes a criminal offense, but that does not convert a civil suit to recover damages on those facts into a criminal proceeding. The difference was appreciated by Solicitor General Bork, who pointed out that "just as an individual may be both criminally prosecuted and deported for the same offense * . .a civil officer could be both impeached and criminally punished .... ,81' Deportation, the Supreme Court held, "is not punishment for a crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing the return to his country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions" laid down for his residence, 182 exactly as impeachment is designed solely to remove an unfit officer for the good of the state. That criminal prosecution may also be had on the same grounds does not render either deportation or removal by impeachment criminal. Solicitor General Bork justly concluded that "conviction of impeach. ment under our Constitution has no criminal consequences," whereas "impeachment in England was designed to accomplish punishment as well as removal."' 183 Without criminal penalties such as fine or imprisonment, and limited to removal of an unfit officer, impeachment cannot be criminal in nature. 18 4 But, Mr. St. Clair argues, such terms as "convicted" and the like "are all terms limited in context to criminal matters."' 1 83 This terminology was taken into account by me in 1970, and I suggested that the Framers, engaged in an immense task-the drafting of a written Constitution for a new nation in the short space of fourteen weeks -could not at each step undertake "to coin a fresh and different vocabulary." That would have involved an insuperable labor.',, As the Department of Justice lawyers recognize, quoting Professor John Pomeroy's mid-19th century treatise, "The word is borrowed, the procedure is imitated, and no more; the object and end of the 181. Bork, supra note 71, at 10n.**. More than a little confusion has resulted from the fact that the Constitution employs the words "high crimes and misdemeanors." The starting point is that "high crimes and misdemeanors" and ordinary "crimes and misdemeanors" are altogether different in meaning and origin. "High crimes and misdemeanors," which the historical evidence shows meant "high crimes and high misdemeanors," referred to offenses against the state, as the companion words "treason, bribery" indicate. Such offenses were triable by Parliament under the Lex Parliamentaria or law of Parliament. When the words were first employed in 1386 there was no such ordinary crime as "misdemeanor"; lesser crimes were then punishable as "trespasses."
R. BERGER,
"Misdemeanors" supplanted "trespasses" early in the 16th century, and, as Fitzjames Stephen pointed out, they were proceedings for wrongs against the individual and were triable in the courts rather than in Parliament. 8 8 It is safe to say that "high crimes and misdemeanors" were words of art peculiar to parliamentary impeachment 8 9 and had no relation to ordinary "crimes and misdemeanors" that were triable by the courts. "High misdeme'anors," it may be added, never entered the criminal law administered by the English couirts, nor were ordinary "misdemeanors" a criterion for impeachments. 190 In the main, Mr 91 He agrees that the word "high" modifies both "crimes and misdemeanors," and "refers to official conduct, conduct relating to one's function with respect to the State."' 19 2 But he repeatedly skitters from "high misdemeanor" to "misdemeanor"; he cites, for example, Blackstone's distinction between "crimes" and "smaller faults and omissions . . . termed misdemeanors," notwithstanding that Blackstone, as Mr. St. Clair notices, differentiated "high misdemeanors" as "high offenses against the King and government.'' 1 9 3 The Framers well understood that "high misdemeanors" had a "technical meaning too limited"; 9 4 and intellectual honesty demands an end to such verbal play on "misdemeanor," an end to shifts from historical meaning to "its present day context," whereunder "the purpose of inclusion of the word 'misdemeanor' is to include lesser criminal offenses that are not felonies. "' 195 For the Framers undeniably bor- 191 . St ." 4 V. BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at 121 (emphasis in original). Contempts were punished by the respective tribunals against whom contemptuous conduct was proven, the courts or the Parliament. I recall no case in which Parliament turned to a court for punishment of a contempt against itself. 194 . R . BERGER, supra note 68, at 86. 195 . St . Clair, supra note 141, at 34 (emphasis in original). It is beside the point to say that "in common parlance a misdemeanor is considered a crime by lawyers, judges, defendants, and the general public," id. at 33, first, because a "high misdemeanor" is quite different from a "misdemeanor," and second, because the test of such a "technical" common law term is not present "common parlance" but what it meant to the Framers.
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the Thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its 209 But there is a median possibility which in fact was the choice of the Framers: Impeachment would be both limited and noncriminal. In noticing that "high crimes and misdemeanors" had a "technical meaning too limited," the Framers exhibited awareness that the words had a "limited" content defined by the English practice at the adoption of the Constitution. As we have seen, they repeatedly referred to the established categories, namely, subversion of the Constitution, abuse of power, neglect of duty -all nonindictable and limited offenses.. 2 10 To be sure, these are broad categories, but no more so than many standards employed by the law, such as restraint of trade, the care of an ordinary prudent man, or due process itself.
The English categories expressed the evils at which the Framers squarely aimed; Mr. St. Clair's attempts to explain them away are a grasping at straws. Consider his argument based on the rejection of "maladministration" as an impeachable offense in favor of "high crimes and misdemeanors" in an effort to show that "impeachment was designed to deal exclusively with indictable criminal conduct." "Thus," he states, the Framers "manifested their intention to narrow the scope of impeachable offenses." 21 ' Without doubt the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" is narrower than "maladministration," which might include minor examples of mismanagement. But rejection of "maladministration" does not spell a "narrowing" of "high crimes and misdemeanors"; we need to look to "high crimes 208. Id St . Clair, supra note 141, at 30-31, 32. He argues that Gouverneur Morris' argument for retention of Mason's proposed "maladministration" on the ground that "it will not be put in force & can do no harm-an election of every four years will prevent maladministration," 2 FARRAND, supra note 89, at 550, "expressed the will of the Convention," St. Clair 31, notwithstanding that the Convention then proceeded to reject Morris' plea for "maladministration" and substituted "high crimes and misdemeanors." Such analysis is sloppy. sion, the last discussion of the subject on September 8 was Mason's admonition that provision must be made for "great and dangerous offenses," such as the nonindictable subversion of the Constitution, which led directly to the adoption of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors." 2 ' 10 Moreover, when the Founders referred to the earlier categories in the several Ratification Conventions, they clearly demonstrated their satisfaction with the noncriminal content of "high crimes and misdemeanors"; and, as we have seen, Madison listed still other nonindictable offenses in the First Congress.
To illustrate "the opposition of the Framers to the abuse in the English tradition," Mr. St . Clair points to their proscription of bills of attainder, corruption of blood, and narrow definition of treason. 22 0 These examples demonstrate, however, that the Framers well knew how to reject undesirable practices. The fact that they defined treason narrowly and left "high crimes and misdemeanors" untouched indicates that they were content to follow English practice in "high crimes and misdemeanors,"1 22 1 as their references to the several categories confirm. Mr. St. Clair further argues that the treason and attainder examples "express the deep commitment to due process which permeates the Constitution. This due process would be emasculated if the impeachment process were not limited to indictable offenses." 222 Since it is the intention of the Framers that Mr. St. Clair purports to seek, we must view due process as they did. For them due process merely demanded conformity with the procedure required by the law of the land. Hamilton gave, as an example, "due process of law, that is by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men, and trial and conviction in consequence." 223 Charges filed 219. Id. at 30-31. 220 . Id. at 14, 16-17, 40. 221 . A striking example of the Founders' assumption that English law would be applicable unless barred is exhibited by the First Congress' prohibition of resort to "benefit of clergy" as an exemption from capital punishment, an exemption first afforded by the common law to the clergy and then to such of the laity as could read. R. BERCER, supra note 68, at 76. St . Clair also argues that because the "pardon power is explicitly excluded for impeachment convictions" it "can only be understood as a reaction to and rejection of the English political impeachments." The exclusion proves exactly the contrary: The fact that a pardon can not save one convicted on impeachment shows an intention to preserve impeachments of whatever nature. The exception for pardons derived from English history and practice, when the pardon of the Earl of Danby by Charles II, after his impeachment, blew up a storm. As a result, the Act of Settlement fashioned a partial bar to such pardons; and a remark by George Nicholas in the Virginia Ratification Convention shows that the Founders were aware of this history: "Few ministers will ever run the risk of being impeached, when they know the King cannot protect them by a pardon." R. BERcFR The emphasis on "money" is apt to overshadow that Hastings was charged with governing "arbitrarily," the classic impeachable offense, and that Burke's accusations reached far deeper than "bribery." In his opening statement before the Lords he stated, It is by this tribunal that statesmen who abuse their power . .. are tried .. .not upon the niceties of a narrow [criminal] jurisprudence, but upon the enlarged and solid principles of morality. 237 o
Observe that Burke, the hero of the Founders for his defense of the American revolt, emphasized that "abuse of power" was not to be tried by the narrow principles of criminal law. And he concluded, "I impeach Warren Hastings of high crimes and misdemeanors. I impeach him in the name of the Commons . . . whose trust he has betrayed ... .1, 238 To ignore these statements while concentrating, attention on "bribery" is to deal in halftruths and to stray from candor. Enough has been set out to expose Mr. St. Clair's cavalier treatment of history; and though it is tempting to invoke the Latin maxim, so often applied by the courts-false in one thing, false in everything-I prefer rather to forego analysis of the rest of the 61-page St. Clair memorandum in order to spare the reader a needlessly wearisome and tedious journey. Against this background it is sheer effrontery to say, as does Mr. St. Clair, [a]ny analysis that broadly construes the power to impeach and convict can be reached only by reading Constitutional authorities selectively, by lifting specific historical precedents out of their precise historical context, by disregarding the plain meaning and accepted definition of technical, legal terms-in short, by placing a subjective gloss on the history of impeachment that results in permitting the Congress to do whatever it deems most politic. 39 In conclusion, Mr. St. Clair has resolutely closed his eyes to adverse facts throughout, to the impact of the American separation 236. Id 
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The President, Congress, and the Courts of removal on impeachment from criminal trial by jury of "all criminal prosecutions" if, as he argues, the removal proceeding must be regarded as criminal in nature. "Historical reconstruction," said a distinguished English historian, Sir Herbert Butterfield, "must at least account for the evidence that is discrepant, and must explain how the rejected testimony came to exist." 2 40 Judges too require lawyers to meet the arguments of opposing counsel. When Mr. St . Clair neglects to do so and wraps himself in the cloak of pseudo-history, he lays himself open to the suspicion that he is not so much engaged in honest reconstruction of history as in propaganda whose sole purpose is to influence public opinion in favor of a client who is under grave suspicion. An "acquittal so obtained," said Macaulay, "cannot be pleaded in bar of the judgment of history." 
